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PEER-TO-PEER COMBAT:
THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY'S ARSENAL
IN ITS WAR ON DIGITAL PIRACY
"[T]he battle against file sharing has become the entertainment
industry's version of the War on Drugs, an expensive, protracted,
apparently ineffective and seemingly misguided battle against a
contraband that many suggest does little harm."]
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital piracy is not a new problem. 2 The ongoing discussion sur-
rounding it is, however, continually renewed as emerging technologies are
employed in both piracy and anti-piracy efforts.3 The entertainment in-
dustry has employed, is employing and is looking to employ various meth-
ods to protect more efficiently its intellectual property rights in a world
that is largely tolerant of copyright infringement.
4
1. Farhad Manjoo, Sour Notes (July 30, 2002), at http://archive.salon.com/
tech/feature/2002/07/30/filetrading/print.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
2. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1169 (7th ed. 1999) (defining piracy as "[t]he
unauthorized and illegal reproduction or distribution of materials protected by
copyright, patent, or trademark law"). Digital piracy, as discussed in this Note, is
the piracy of digital content, i.e., software, digital music and digital motion
pictures.
3. See Stan Liebowitz, Policing Pirates in the Networked Age, POL'Y ANALYSIS No.
438, at I (May 15, 2002), at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa438.pdf (recogniz-
ing that new technologies employed in piracy and anti-piracy efforts attract atten-
tion and analysis to digital piracy issue). Liebowitz observes:
New Internet-based technologies appear to threaten the ability of copy-
right owners to collect revenues for their intellectual creations . . .re-
sult[ing] in new legislation against pirating and .. .giv[ing] rise to new
technologies to protect intellectual products. Both the new technologies
and the counter-technologies that have followed them have attracted at-
tention and analysis, sometimes bordering on the apocalyptic, from com-
peting camps.
Id.
4. See Hiawatha Bray, Tech Industry Issues Warning on Antipiracy, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 16, 2002, at D2 (reporting that information technology (IT) industry
executives are working with Hollywood to find technical ways to limit piracy); Com-
pany Town: Hollywood Boosts Campaign Donations: Politics, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2000,
at C5 ("Hollywood has been lobbying in Washington to seek ways to fight growing
piracy of movies and music on the Internet."); Kay Larsen, Napster May Have Re-
formed, But Web Music Piracy Thrives, WALL ST. J. EuR.,June 12, 2002, at M2 (explain-
ing that recording industry is developing anti-piracy tactics based on technology
being developed by motion picture industry); Todd Shields, Techno Phobias: Media
Execs Fear Piracy of Digital Content But Are Split Over How to Stifle It, MEDIAWK., April 1,
2002, at 11 (reporting that film, computer and consumer-electronics industries
have formed Copy Protection Technical Working Group to discuss ways of stifling
digital piracy); Lisa M. Bowman, File-traders in the Crosshairs (July 15, 2002), at
(667)
1
Mousley: Peer-to-Peer Combat: The Entertainment Industry's Arsenal in Its
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
V1LINovA LAW REVIEW
These anti-piracy methods can be divided into three general ap-
proaches: legal, social and market.5 Analysis of the current state of each of
these categories reveals that legal approaches, while popular with the re-
cording and motion picture industries, provide only limited success and
threaten to backfire as they become increasingly insular in their protec-
tion of copyright owners.6 Theoretically, social approaches offer the most
effective means of addressing digital piracy, but ultimately remain largely
ideological with little hope of ever being reduced to practice. 7 Market
approaches prove to be effective immediate remedies, but ultimately de-
pend upon constant evolution and innovation to sustain anything beyond
an ephemeral solution. 8
This Note discusses, categorizes and analyzes the different approaches
already employed and those being developed to combat the piracy of
copyrighted digital material in the United States. 9 Part II discusses the
problemrs and challenges digital piracy poses to the industries it affects the
most: the software, recording and motion picture industries. 10 Part III
summarizes the relevant history of copyright law in the United States, pro-
viding a background for how copyright infringement is defined and con-
templated in this country." Part V reviews the most recent legislation
enacted to update copyright law in response to the modern threat of digi-
tal piracy. 12 Part V categorizes and analyzes current and developing ap-
proaches to digital piracy.' 3
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-943881.html ("'[T]he [recording] industry is
looking at a variety of tactics to tackle online piracy."') (quoting recording indus-
try executive).
5. For a further discussion of the categorization of approaches to digital
piracy, see infra notes 104-96 and accompanying text.
6. For a further discussion of legal approaches to digital piracy, see infra notes
107-30 and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of social approaches to digital piracy, see infra
notes 131-48 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of market approaches to digital piracy, see infra
notes 149-96 and accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion of approaches to digital piracy, see infra notes 104-
96 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of challenges faced by the entertainment indus-
try, see infra notes 14-56 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of fundamental United States copyright law, see
infra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of recently enacted copyright law, see infra notes
80-103 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of categories of approaches to digital piracy, see
infra notes 104-96 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 48: p. 667
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II. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES POSED BY DIGITAL PIRACY
A. The Software Industry
Piracy has long been a bane to the software industry. 14 Even before
the Internet, piracy in the form of sophisticated counterfeiting operations
and casual workplace copying threatened the viability and creativity of
software publishers. 15 Since the Internet has become ubiquitous, how-
ever, software piracy has become pandemic.
16
The Business Software Alliance (BSA) 17 estimates that in 2001 the
worldwide business software piracy rate was forty percent, costing the in-
dustry $10.97 billion in lost revenues.' 8 This figure is consistent with an
increasing trend from thirty-six percent in 1999 and thirty-seven percent
in 2000.19 Although the piracy rate was the lowest worldwide at twenty-five
percent, companies in the U.S. lost revenues totaling $1.81 billion, more
than any other country.29° Furthermore, although monetary losses due to
piracy declined both worldwide and in the United States since 2000, the
14. See BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, INTERNET SOFTWARE PIRACY: ENFORCE-
MENT 1 (2002), at http://www.bsa.org/usa/policyres/admin/InternetPiracy-
Enforcement.pdf ("Software publishers have long suffered from the impact that
traditional forms of piracy have had on their markets, their economic viability and
their ability to create new products.").
15. See id. ("Copying in the workplace, counterfeiting and various forms of
illegal distribution cost the industry billions and billions of dollars each year.").
16. See id. ("Unauthorized electronic distribution and sale of copyrighted
works over the Internet threatens [sic] to make [traditional software piracy meth-
ods] seem almost quaint by comparison."). The Internet has affected software
piracy in at least three significant ways. See id. (positing three ways Internet has
affected software piracy). First, it provides a "vast, borderless, sleepless market-
place for ... pirated software." Id. Second, its increasing ease of access and faster
connection speeds allow even the least sophisticated computer users to obtain pi-
rated software with little difficulty. See id. ("Today, even the most novice of com-
puter users can easily find his or her way to pirated software."). Third, its
anonymous nature provides a lower risk of detection than traditional modes of
unauthorized distribution. See id. (describing nature of Internet as "unrestricted,
self-regulated and largely anonymous").
17. See Business Software Alliance, About BSA, at http://www.bsa.org/usa/
about/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (stating that Business Software Alliance is interna-
tional consortium of companies in software, hardware and Internet industries).
Established in 1988, the BSA's mission is to promote "a safe and legal online
world" by educating consumers on software copyrights and cyber security, advocat-
ing public policy that encourages innovation and trade opportunities and fighting
software piracy. Id.
18. See BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, SEVENTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE
PIRACY STUDY 2 Uune 2002), at http://www.bsa.org/resources/2002-06-10.130.pdf
("The purpose of the study is to review the available data and utilize a systematic
methodology to determine the worldwide business software piracy rates and the
associated dollar losses."). The "reported rate" is the percentage of all business
application software installed without a license. See id. (defining research
methods).
19. See id. (reporting worldwide piracy rates for last six years).
20. See id. at 6 (reporting piracy rate and lost revenues for United States).
2003] NOTE 669
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BSA attributes this decline not to less piracy, but to currency fluctuations,
lower software prices and a sluggish economy.
2 1
In a more detailed study of software piracy in the United States, the
BSA estimated that, in 2000, publishers lost a total of $8.31 billion in reve-
nues, $2.63 billion of which was attributed to the piracy of business appli-
cation software.2 2 Typically, the publishers hit hardest are those that
produce industry standard applications whose licenses are often relatively
expensive. 23 For example, Autodesk, publisher of the professional stan-
dard design program AutoCAD, estimates that only one in five computers
running its program has a legal copy.24 Considering a legal license for
one copy of the program costs $3,750, that proportion translates to a sig-
nificant loss. 25 Beyond the losses sustained by the software industry, the
BSA reported that piracy cost the U.S. economy 118,000 lost jobs, $5.67
billion in lost wages and $1.59 billion in lost tax revenue in 2000.23
B. The Recording Industry
Digital piracy began to afflict the recording industry in the late 1990s
with the popularization of MP3, a technology that allows digital audio re-
cordings to be compressed to manageable file sizes. 27 These compressed
music files were first distributed somewhat inefficiently on the Internet
through web pages, newsgroups, chat rooms and email. 28 Although a
large amount of material was available at various places on the Internet,
21. See id. at 2 (explaining decreasing losses despite increasing piracy rates).
22. See BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, U.S. SoFTWARE STATE PIRACY SruDY 7
(Nov. 2001), at http://www.bsa.org/tsa/policyres/admin/2001-11-01.65.pdf
[hereinafter STATE PIRACY STUDY] (studying effects of piracy on American software
industry).
23. See Kevin Washington, Software Makers Battle Pirates' with Education: Rip-offs:
Copies, Counterfeit Versions and Illegal Multiple Use of Programs Cost Publishers and Users
Billions Each Year, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2002, at 11 C (discussing losses suffered by
various prominent software publishers due to piracy).
24. See id. (providing specific examples of software publishers most affected
by piracy).
25. See id. (quoting Autodesk's Director of Piracy Prevention).
26. See STATE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 22, at 7 (reporting effects of software
piracy on United States economy).
27. See generally JUSTIN FRANKEL, DAVE GREELY & BEN SAWYER, MP3 POWER!
WITH WINAMP (1999) (providing exhaustive discussion of MP3 technology history
and development); Corey Rayburn, Note, After Napster, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 16
(2001), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue3/v6i3-al6-Rayburn.html (explaining
development and popularization of MP3 technology); The History of MP3 and How
Did It All Begin?, at http://www.mp3-mac.com/Pages/History-ofMP3.html (last
visited Jan. 7, 2003) (summarizing history of MP3 technology with timeline).
28. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHL. L. Riv. 263, 272 (2002) (discussing
introduction of MP3 technology to Internet users).
[Vol. 48: p. 667
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users generally had to be more familiar with less mainstream venues to
find and download the music they wanted.29
Enter Napster, the peer-to-peer (P2P) network that revolutionized In-
ternet file-sharing by streamlining the process of finding and downloading
music.3 0 Napster's ease of use and explosive popularity created a limitless
MP3 free-for-all; at its peak, Napster estimated that seventy-five million
users were downloading approximately ten thousand songs per second.3 1
Because the bulk of the music on its network was copyrighted material, all
five major recording labels brought suit against Napster for contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement. 32 The labels were successful in forc-
ing the company to stop offering copyrighted material on its network,
causing the network to lose popularity just as quickly as it had arisen.-'3
Despite the fall of Napster at the beginning of the millennium, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) reported that its indus-
try lost $4.2 billion in 2001.1 4 One reason for this loss is that in the wake
of Napster, several alternative P2P networks became popular among MP3
29. See id. at 273 ("Before Napster, music and other content were only availa-
ble if someone posted the content to a web page or newsgroup or attached it to an
e-mail.").
30. See id. ("Peer-to-peer networking dramatically expands the universe of
available music[,] . . . streamlin[ing] the publishing process by making informa-
tion residing on a user's computer hard drive directly available to other users of
the network.").
31. See id. at 273 n.61-64 (citing A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000)) (noting extensive use of Napster as indicated
by its internal documents).
32. See id. (citing Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900) (indicating plaintiffs' causes
of action). Contributory infringement occurs when one knowingly induces or con-
tributes to the infringement of another. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGFT § 1.5 (2d ed.
1996) (defining and explaining contributory infringement). Vicarious liability oc-
curs when defendant's "right and ability to supervise infringing activity coalesce
with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copy-righted
materials-even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly
is being impaired." Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307
(2d Cir. 1963) (imposing liability "upon the beneficiary of that exploitation").
33. SeeA & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (enjoining Napster from "engaging in, or facilitating others in copying,
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musi-
cal compositions and sound recordings, protected by either federal or state law,
without express permission of the rights owner"), affd in relevant part, 239 F.3d
1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding preliminary injunction forcing Napster to
stop offering copyrighted material on its network); see also Reid Kanaley & Patrick
Kerkstra, Ruling Could Doom Napster: An Appeals Court Agreed the Internet Service Broke
Copyright Laws, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 13, 2001, at Al (summarizing history of Nap-
ster service and litigation).
34. See Warren Cohen, Special Report: Copy-Protected CDs, ROLLING STONE, June
7, 2002, at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/newsarticle.asp?nid=15990 (report-
ing estimated losses to recording industry). In a $33.7 billion market, this figure
represents more than a ten percent loss. See id. (framing estimated losses as pro-
portion of total market).
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traders. 35 These networks, many of which are derivatives of the open-
source Gnutella network, have no central server coordinating communica-
tions between their users.3 6 Consequently, while the recording industry
has had some success in getting copyrighted material off centralized P2P
networks by threatening to sue central servers, the non-centralized aspect
of the most popular current networks makes filing a lawsuit against a cen-
tral server impossible.3 7
C. The Motion Picture Industry
Digital piracy is a relatively new threat to the motion picture industry,
but based on the losses sustained by the software and recording industries,
this threat is no less dangerous. 38 Until recently, widespread piracy of mo-
tion pictures was limited by a number of factors. 9 First, file sizes of movie
recordings on computers were unmanageable; without compression pro-
tocols, movie files were too large to be put on compact discs (CDs) or to
transfer conveniently over the Internet. 4° Second, even for computer
35. See Manjoo, supra note I (noting variety of alternative P2P networks cur-
rently handle bulk of file sharing).
36. See Liebowitz, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining that Gnutella networks have
no central server, making copyright enforcement much harder). Popular Gnutella
derivatives include BearShare, Aimster, LimeWire and Morpheus. See id. at 14 (list-
ing P2P networks that operate on Gnutella protocols); see also Gnutelliums, at http:/
/www.gnutelliums.com/ (last visitedJan. 7, 2003) (providing comprehensive list of
GntItella clients for various platforms). KaZaA, another non-centralized P2P net-
work, operates on the FastTrack network, an alternative to Gnutella. See KaZaA,
FastTrack and Gnutella, at http://www.kazaa.com/en/help/fasttrakandgnutella.
htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (comparing performance of FastTrack and Gnutella
networks).
37. See Audiogalaxy Settles Music Piracy Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2002, at
D6 (reporting that Audiogalaxy P2P network service settled lawsuit brought by re-
cording industry companies for "a substantial sum"). Recording industry compa-
nies have brought similar suits against Streamcast Networks, Inc., Kazaa BV and
Grokster Ltd. See id. (discussing P2P network litigation). Audiogalaxy has since
contracted with Listen.com to become a distributor of its Rhapsody subscription
service. See Brian Garrity, Audiogalaxy Pacts with Listen.com: Deal Brings Rhapsody
Music Subscription Service to New Galaxy of Listeners, BILLBD., Sept. 21, 2002, at 6 (ex-
plaining that "[t] he deal between Audiogalaxy and Listen marks the first commer-
cial deployment of a major-label-sanctioned subscription service through a P2P
network").
38. See Lee Comes, Now, the 'Napsterization'of Movies, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2000,
at BI (quoting Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president and CEO
Jack Valenti as saying, "[The technology] is moving extremely fast. I worry about
the possibility that what happened to music will soon be happening to movies.").
39. See Christian John Pantages, Comment, Avast Ye, Hollywood! Digital Motion
Picture Piracy Comes of Age, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 155, 161 (2002) (delineating previ-
Otis barriers to digital motion picture piracy); Comes, supra note 38, at BI (com-
menting on changes in technology that have made digital piracy of motion
pictures more threatening to motion picture industry).
40. See Pantages, supra note 39, at 161-62 (discussing file size barrier to digital
piracy of motion pictures); Comes, supra note 38, at BI ("[I]n contrast to MP3
music files, DVD movie files are extremely large .... ").
[Vol. 48: p. 667
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users with hard drives large enough to accommodate massive movie files,
the fastest existing Internet connection speeds were still too slow to make
wide dissemination of movies practical. 4 ' Third, unlike CDs, digital versa-
tile discs (DVDs) containing movie files were encrypted. 4 2 By incorporat-
ing Content Scrambling System (CSS) encryption technology, DVDs
allowed users to play, but not copy content.43 Finally, due to the difficul-
ties in copying and disseminating digital movie files, most pirated movies
available were analog recordings made by pirates smuggling camcorders
into cinemas. 44 These recordings were often of very low quality, far infer-
ior to the digital quality of a DVD. 4
5
Recently, however, all of these barriers to digital piracy of movies have
collapsed. 46 The MP3 analogue to motion pictures, DivX, made it possi-
ble to compress a five gigabyte DVD file to 700 megabytes, roughly the
capacity of a blank CD. 4 7 Cable and Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) broad-
band connections have become increasingly available and more affordable
to private homes across the country, making the transfer of such files
much more convenient and less time-consuming. 48 In 1999, a Norwegian
teen reverse-engineered the CSS encryption technology used on most
DVDs to create a utility, DeCSS, which was capable of decrypting DVD
files, allowing them to be copied.49 With the ability to decrypt DVDs and
41. See Pantages, supra note 39, at 161-62 (explaining that even on fastest ex-
isting broadband connections transmitting one movie file required several hours
of uninterrupted transfer); Gomes, supra note 38, at BI ("[I]n contrast to MP3
music files, DVD movie files . . . require many hours, even days, to download.").
42. See Pantages, supra note 39, at 162 (discussing DVD encryption as barrier
to digital piracy of motion pictures).
43. See id. at 163 (explaining CSS encryption of DVD movies). For a further
discussion of CSS encryption technology on DVDs, see infra notes 152-55 and ac-
companying text.
44. See id. at 162 (explaining that piracy of motion pictures in theaters in-
volved videotaping movie screen).
45. See id. (comparing quality of analog recordings to digital copies); Gomes,
supra note 38, at BI (highlighting sharp contrast between DVD quality digital mo-
tion pictures and "grainy pirated [analog] movies . . . created by camcorder-
equipped movie pirates who sneaked into theaters").
46. See Pantages, supra note 39, at 163 ("[Since 1996], several radical develop-
ments destabilized the [motion picture] copyright holders' ability to control their
products.").
47. See id. at 164 (indicating capabilities of DivX protocol); Gomes, supra note
38, at BI (noting development of DivX protocol). DivX is a variant of Microsoft's
version of MPEG-4, a standard video-compression protocol. See id. at BI (discuss-
ing DivX compression protocol). The protocol was the product of a collaboration
between a French video engineer and a German computer hacker. See id. (ex-
plaining that creators officially dubbed protocol "DivX ;-)" in mocking reference to
earlier protocol named "DivX" that stressed anti-piracy features).
48. See Pantages, supra note 39, at 165-66 (discussing impact of widespread
home broadband connections on digital piracy).
49. See id. at 163 (tracing development of DeCSS program to Jon Johansen
and two friends); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, II1 F. Supp. 2d
294, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (providing detailed history of DeCSS development).
2003] 673NOTE
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compress large files down to manageable sizes without loss in quality, digi-
tal piracy began to replace analog piracy, encouraging more and more
casual computer users to dabble in "ripping" and trading movies.50
Today, research suggests that anywhere from 300,000 to 350,000 pi-
rated movies are downloaded on the Internet each day.5'I The Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) suggests that those estimates
should be even higher.5 2 Augmented further by a loss of three to four
billion dollars per year to analog piracy, the net loss sustained by the mo-
tion picture industry due to piracy is staggering.
5 3
The effect of digital piracy on the software, recording and motion
picture industries is undeniable. 54 Faced with this serious threat to their
economic viability, these industries have a clear interest in vigorously pro-
tecting the legal rights to their products. 5 5 As tangible forms of expres-
sion of intellectual property, these products find legal protection under
copyright law.
5 6
50. See TEcHENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/define
term?term=ripping (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (defining ripping as "extracting the
digital data from an audio CD"). Ripping also refers to extracting the digital data
from a DVD. See Reimerdes, II1 F. Snpp. 2d at 311 (noting that decrypting DVD
with DeCSS is referred to as ripping).
51. See Macrovision and Websense Announce New Partnership to Prevent
Unauthorised Digital Material in the Workplace, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 8, 2002, available at
2002 WL 26804117 ("[One] research firm, Viant of Boston, estimated in June 2001
that more than 300,000 to 350,000 pirated movies are downloaded from the In-
ternet worldwide everyday.").
52. See Hiawatha Bray, Bills Would Weaken Digital Antipiracy Law: Aim is to Legal-
ize Bypass Software, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 2002, at E4 (" 'We're already an industry
that's seen 400,000 to 600,000 movies illegally downloaded every day ... ') (quot-
ing MPAA Vice President of Public Affairs Richard Taylor). The recent emergence
of digital motion picture piracy has been compared to that of digital audio piracy
when MP3 technology had just been introduced to the Internet. See Gomes, supra
note 38, at BI ("'Right now, DivX is where MP3s were when they first came out. It
took a while for people to catch on, but it's gaining fast."') (quoting video software
web site operatorJan Devos).
53. See Press Release, U.S. Sen. Fritz Hollings, Introduction of the Consumer
Broadband and Digital Television Act of 2002 (Mar. 21, 2002), at http://politech
bot.com/docs/cbdtpa/hollings.cbdtpa.release.032102.html (reporting MPAA rev-
enue loss estimates).
54. For a further discussion of the effect of digital piracy on the software,
recording and motion picture industries, see supra notes 14-56 and accompanying
text.
55. For a further discussion of the economic impact of digital piracy on the
software, recording and motion picture industries, see supra notes 22-26, 34 and
51-53 and accompanying text.
56. See David S. Fleming & Laura Beth Miller, Copyright Law in the Digital Age,
in 1 ILL. INSTrr. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., BUSINESS, LAW, AND THE INTERNET
HANDBOOK § 6.1 (Mar. 2002) ("Copyright law protects tangible forms of expres-
sion of intellectual property.").
[Vol. 48: p. 667
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1II. SUMMARY OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
American copyright law begins with the Constitution: "The Congress
shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 57 Congress has exercised
this power several times since these words were written, enacting, amend-
ing and otherwise modernizing legislation when emerging technologies
challenged existing protections and raised novel infringement issues.
5 s
Current copyright law under the Copyright Act of 1976 is codified in Title
17 of the United States Code.
59
With the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress estab-
lished a standard federal structure for copyrights on both published and
unpublished works, preempting most state common law and statutory pro-
tections. 60 This structure provides for the protection of an author's rights
of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance and display6' in all
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
58. See Fleming & Miller, supra note 56, § 6.1 (highlighting evolution of Amer-
ican copyright law).
59. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (2001) (providing current codification
of copyright law).
60. See Fleming & Miller, supra note 56, § 6.2 (discussing federal preemption
of state copyright law with Copyright Act of 1976). The relevant section of the
United States Code provides:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copy-
right as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or
after that date and whether published or unpublished are governed ex-
clusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right
or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of
any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2001).
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001) (listing specific rights granted to copyright
owner). This section grants a copyright owner the exclusive rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
9
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original works "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 62 A work is
so fixed when "its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the
authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration. '63
Copyright protection automatically begins when a work is created
(i.e., fixed in a tangible form), and, for works created on or afterJanuary
1, 1978, this protection generally endures until seventy years after the au-
thor's death.64 Consistent with the constitutional language providing pro-
tection "for limited Times, ' 65 these terms ensure that "modern works will
be copyrighted for at least as long as they are commercially viable."66 Af-
ter the period of copyright protection for a work expires, the public may
use the work freely as part of the public domain. 67
62. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2001) (extending copyright protection to "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device"). This section
further provides:
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
Id.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2001) ("Copyright in a work created on or after
January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and ... endures for a term consisting of
the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death."). For works made for
hire, copyright protection lasts for the shorter of 120 years from the year of crea-
tion or ninety-five years from the year of first publication. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c)
("In the case of... a work made for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95
years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of
its creation, whichever expires first."). A work made for hire is defined as:
(1) work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution
to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66. Fleming & Miller, supra note 56, § 6.10 (providing time limitations on
copyrights).
67. See id. (explaining that works such as Shakespeare's writings, Bach's sym-
phonies, Michelangelo's artwork and Homer's epic poems are examples of works
in public domain).
676
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Authors have three principal measures for effectively protecting their
copyrighted material: notice, registration and litigation. 68 Notice, the eas-
iest and least expensive protection method, consists of formal notice
printed on the material itself and written notice sent to potential or actual
infringers. 69 Registration, another relatively easy and inexpensive protec-
tion method, consists of sending a form, copies of the work and a filing fee
to the Copyright Office at the Library of Congress. 7 1 Lastly, authors may
protect their works through litigation.
7 1
A copyright owner may bring an infringement action for another's
unauthorized exercise of any of the exclusive rights comprising a copy-
right.72 A prima facie case of infringement requires that the copyright
owner prove: (1) ownership of the right allegedly infringed and (2) actual
infringement by defendant of original portions of the work.7 3 Remedies
for a successful copyright infringement action include injunctive relief,7"
impounding or destruction of infringing articles,75 monetary damages7 6
and criminal penalties. 77 To balance an author's private interests with the
68. See id. § 6.15 (discussing three ways to protect copyrighted material).
69. See id. § 6.16 ("The easiest and least expensive way to protect copyrights is
through notice. This includes formal notice printed on the materials as well as
notifying potential or actual infringers in writing."). Formal printed notice on a
protected material should take the form "© [year of first publication] [copyright
owner's name]. All rights reserved." See id. (providing suggested form of formal
notice). Requirements for formal notice under United States law are found in 17
U.S.C. §§ 401-06. The symbol © may be replaced by the word "Copyright," or the
abbreviation "Copr." 17 U.S.C. § 401 (b) (1) (2001). The year of the current publi-
cation may be written right after the year of first publication, if the years are differ-
ent. See Fleming & Miller, supra note 56, § 6.16 (explaining that year of current
publication placed after year of first publication may be single year or range of
years). The phrase "all rights reserved," while not required by United States copy-
right law, generally provides international protection. See id. (discussing utility of
phrase "all rights reserved").
70. See Fleming & Miller, supra note 56, § 6.17 (describing registration as
"easy yet powerful way to protect copyright"). Registration is a necessary require-
ment for most infringement actions and for certain remedies. See 17 U.S.C. § 411
(2001) (requiring registration before institution of most infringement actions); 17
U.S.C. § 412 (2001) (requiring registration for awards of statutory damages or at-
torney's fees).
71. See Fleming & Miller, supra note 56, § 6.18 (discussing general issues that
may arise in copyright litigation).
72. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-05 (2001). (addressing infringement and
remedies).
73. See Fleming & Miller, supra note 56, § 6.13 (citing Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)) (providing two elements for
prima facie case of infringement).
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (providing for injunctive relief remedy).
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 503 (providing for impounding or destruction of infring-
ing articles).
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (allowing damages to be calculated as copyright
owner's actual damages, including lost profits or statutory damages).
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2001) (legislating criminal penalties for copyright in-
fringement); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2001) (providing criminal penalties for cop-
yright infringement).
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public interest, the Copyright Act limits the rights granted to a copyright
owner. 78 Among some narrow limitations, broader limitations include fair
use, first sale and duration of rights.
79
V. RECENT LEGISLATION ENACTED TO COMBAT DIGITAL PIRACY
Since the Copyright Act of 1976, at least two significant pieces of legis-
lation amending the Act have specifically addressed digital piracy issues.8 0
The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act and, to a much greater extent, the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) have been used frequently and
successfully in recent actions brought by companies in the entertainment
industry to combat digital piracy.
8 1
A. The No Electronic Theft (NET.) Act
Enacted on December 16, 1997, the NET Act amended two sections
of the Copyright Act to make it easier to criminally convict digital copy-
right infringers.8 2 Prior to these amendments, copyright infringers who
did not realize commercial advantage or private financial gain could not
be found criminally liable. 83 This Act extended liability to the majority of
78. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107-20 (2001) (providing specific limitations on
copyright owner's exclusive rights).
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing for fair use limitations); 17 U.S.C. § 109
(discussing limitation of first sale, which allows purchaser of copyrighted item to
dispose of it as he wishes); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2001) (limiting duration in copy-
right to author's life plus seventy years if work was created during or after 1978).
80. See Pantages, supra note 39, at 169 (explaining that while most proposed
legislation in Congress addressing digital piracy and Internet regulation has failed
to be ratified, No Electronic Theft (NET) Act and Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) are most notable acts amending Copyright Act to deal with copyright
infringement on Internet).
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (codifying NET Act); Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1122
Stat. 2680 (Oct. 28, 1998) (codifying DMCA); Pantages, supra note 39, at 169 (re-
marking that NET Act and DMCA have been used most frequently and most suc-
cessfully in actions brought by music and motion picture industries).
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (providing criminal liability for specific categories
of copyright infringement); D. Jean Veta & Rochelle E. Rubin, Network and Informa-
tion Security: Domestic and International Initiatives to Combat Cybercrime, in PRAcTIsING
LAW INSTITUTE PATENT, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDmOOK SERIES 955, 983-84 (July 2002) ("The intended consequence [of the
NET Act] was to make it easier to convict hackers for criminal copyright of-
fenses."). As amended, this provision states:
Any person who infringes a copyright willfully either-
(1) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or
(2) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means,
during any 180-day period, of I or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or
more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than
$1,000, shall be punished as provided under [the relevant sentencing
provision].
ld.
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1996) (reciting infringement provision prior to
amendment). The amendment to this section was the addition of § 506(a) (2),
which does not require commercial advantage or private financial gain, as pro-
[Vol. 48: p. 667
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digital pirates: people who do not attempt to profit from their infringing
activities, but rather provide their services for free to build their reputa-
tions as pirates.
8 4
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
Enacted on October 28, 1998, the DMCA implemented two interna-
tional intellectual property treaties signed by the United States in 1996, as
well as other provisions addressing copyright infringement on the In-
ternet.8 5 The DMCA, which comprises five titles, extends greater copy-
right protection to more works, limits the liability of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) as intermediaries in the transmission of copyrighted ma-
terial and provides stiff penalties for the circumvention of copyright pro-
tection systems.
8 6
The anti-circumvention sections of the DMCA are, perhaps, the most
significant provisions affecting the entertainment industry's anti-piracy ef-
forts.8 7 One of these provisions makes it illegal to "circumvent a techno-
logical measure that effectively controls access to a work protected [by
United States copyright law]." 8 A second provision makes it illegal to
"manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in
any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that
[circumvents technological measures controlling access to a protected
work]." 8 9 The penalties for violating these provisions can reach up to $1
million in fines and/or a prison sentence of up to ten years for second and
subsequent offenses. 9°)
vided in § 506(a) (1) to find liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2001) (reciting in-
fringement provision after amendment).
84. See Pantages, supra note 39, at 171-72 (explaining that most pirates give
away pirated material for free, rather than selling it, to build their reputations as
pirates). See generally United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994)
(highlighting inadequacy of previous copyright provisions that required financial
gain for liability). Defendant LaMacchia set up a bulletin board system to dissemi-
nate pirated software. 1I. Prosecution was unsuccessful because defendant did not
seek "or derive any personal benefit from the scheme to defraud." Id. at 537.
85. See Fleming & Miller, supra note 56, § 6.3 (explaining that DMCA imple-
mented World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty). See generally WIPO Copyright
Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, available at http://www.wipo.int/trea-
ties/ip/index.html (providing original international agreement enabled by
DMCA); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 76, available at http://wvw.wipo.int/treaties/ip/index.html (providing orig-
inal international agreement enabled by DMCA).
86. See Fleming & Miller, supra note 56, § 6.3 (discussing sections of DMCA);
Pantages, supra note 39, at 171 (discussing effects of DMCA).
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2001) (providing anti-circumvention provisions of
DMCA).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(l) (A).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2001) (noting criminal penalties for violations of
anti-circumvention provisions of DMCA).
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The motion picture industry has recently used these provisions in ac-
tions against users and traffickers in programs employed to circumvent the
CSS technology protecting copyrighted motion pictures on DVDs.9 In
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,92 for example, eight motion picture
studios filed suit against the publishers of a print magazine and online web
site for violating the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA. 9" Defendant
Eric Corley, publisher of 2600: The Hacker Quarterly and operator of 2600.
com, 9 4 wrote and published an online article containing copies of and
links to the object and source codes for DeCSS.95 After granting plaintiffs
a preliminary injunction barring defendants from posting the DeCSS
code, the district court found that defendants' posting of and linking to
DeCSS violated the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA.9 6 The court
further concluded that enjoining the posting of and linking to the code
did not violate defendants' First Amendment rights.9 7 The Second Circuit
affirmed, upholding the district court's injunctions on the posting of and
linking to the code. 98 Similar suits involving enjoining the publication of
DeCSS have been brought under different theories.99
Although it has provided the entertainment industry with a fairly ef-
fective tool for combating digital piracy, the DMCA has received a signifi-
91. For a firther discussion of CSS encryption technology, see infra notes 152-
55 and accompanying text.
92. 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2) ("No person shall ... offer to the public, pro-
vide, or otherwise traffic in any technology (that] is primarily designed or pro-
duced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under [United States copyright law].").
94. THE HACKE.R QUARTERLY, at http://www.2600.com (last visited Jan. 7,
2003).
95. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09 (noting that in addition to posting
code for DeCSS, The Hacker Quarterly has included articles explaining how to steal
Internet domain names, access other people's email and break into computer sys-
tems). For a further discussion of DeCSS, see supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
96. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 316-24 (finding violation of anti-traffick-
ing provision and that defendant's activities did not fall under several DMCA
exceptions).
97. See id. at 333, 341 (positing clear and convincing standard, which was met
in this case, to overcome general rule against enjoining site containing circumven-
tion technology).
98. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding that District Court's injunction "is consistent with the limitations of the
First Amendment").
99. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 352
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing preliminary injunction of publication of DeCSS
under state trade secret law), review granted and opinion superceded by, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal.
2002). As of Oct. 13, 2002, the parties in Bunner are awaiting a date for oral argu-
ment before the California Supreme Court. See Electronic Frontier Foundation,
Active 1EFF Legal Cases and Efforts, at http://www.eff.org/Legal/activejlegal.html
(indicating status of pending DeCSS litigation).
[Vol. 48: p. 667
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cant amount of criticism by commentators. 1°  Consumer groups such as
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and DigitalConsumer.org
openly oppose the DMCA and are lobbying for changes.' 0 ' These organi-
zations argue that the DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking pro-
visions severely undermine consumers' fair use rights, rights that have
historically been protected by common law and even codified in the Copy-
right Act. 10 2 United States Representative Richard Boucher joins these
groups in denouncing the DMCA and supporting a Digital Consumers'
Bill of Rights that would reaffirm fair use rights.11
3
V. APPROACHES TO COMBATING DIGITAL PIRACY
Despite the entertainment industry's success in enforcing legal rights
to products under the above-mentioned amendments to copyright law, the
continuing threat of digital piracy has prompted the industry to look for
protection beyond existing law. 10 4 Indeed, the current threat of digital
piracy to the economic vitality of the industry has resulted in a diverse
panoply of strategies and approaches in the entertainment industry's "War
on Digital Piracy."' 0 5 These approaches can be divided into three catego-
ries: legal, social and market. 10 6
100. See generally Brian Bolinger, Comment, Focusing on Infringement: Why Limi-
tations on Decryption Technology Are Not the Solution to Policing Copyright, 52 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 1091, 1110 (2002) (arguing that DMCA is inefficient vehicle for polic-
ing use of copyright of digital media); Ryan L. Van Den Elzen, Note, Decrypting the
DMCA: Fair Use as a Defense to the Distribution of DeCSS, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673,
704 (2002) (arguing that DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions frustrate Constitu-
tion's purpose and eliminate users' fair use rights).
101. See. generally DigitalConsumer.org, at http://www.digitalconsumer.org
(last visitedJan. 7, 2003) (claiming to protect "fair use rights in the digital world");
Electronic Frontier Foundation, at http://www.eff.org (last visited Jan. 7, 2003)
(supporting legislation that would amend "infamous" DMCA).
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001) (codifying fair use rights historically protected
by common law).
103. See generally Rick Boucher, Congressman Rick Boucher Urges Reaffirmation of
Fair Use Rights (2002), at http://www.house.gov/boucher/docs/fairuse.htm (dis-
cussing problems with DMCA and urging reaffirmation of fair use rights by Con-
gress); Rick Boucher, Congressman Boucher's New American Foundation Speech on Fair
Use Rights (May 10, 2002), at http://www.house.gov/boucher/docs/fairusespeech.
htm (proposing Congress adopt consumers' bill of rights to clearly establish fair
use as fundamental American right); Rick Boucher, Statement of Congressman Rick
Boucher: "Pay-Per-Use" Society One Step Closer (Oct. 26, 2000), at http://www.house.
gov/boucher/docs/payperuse.htm (arguing that enforcement of new legislation
will lead to society where use of all intellectual property is paid for on per use
basis).
104. For a further discussion of alternative approaches to combating digital
piracy, see infra notes 110-96 and accompanying text.
105. For a further discussion of the economic effects of digital piracy on the
software, recording and motion picture industries, see supra notes 22-26, 34 and
51-53 and accompanying text.
106. For a further discussion of the categorization of approaches to digital
piracy, see infra notes 106-96 and accompanying text.
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A. Legal Approaches
Legal approaches to combating digital piracy include both the crea-
tion of new legislation and the enforcement of existing laws.U) 7 The goal
of these approaches is to curtail copyright infringement by giving copy-
right owners more effective means to protect their intellectual property
rights.1( 8 As discussed above, the enactments of the DMCA and NET Act
have already proved to be useful, albeit controversial, weapons in the en-
tertainment industry's legal arsenal. 1 9 Beyond these recent amendments
to the Copyright Act, however, proposed legislation pending in Congress
seeks to expand the entertainment industry's ability to enforce existing
copyright law with radical technological measures. 110
One bill now being considered in Congress, Senator Hollings' Con-
sumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act (CBDTPA), 1'
would require all new hardware and software to have embedded copy-pro-
tection schemes approved by the Federal Government and regulated by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)." 12 To achieve this goal
in a timely manner, the bill forces content, consumer electronics and in-
formation technology industries to join with consumer groups to develop
viable standards, technologies and encoding rules within one year.' 1-3 If
these negotiations fail, the FCC is to take over.' 14
In the House of Representatives, Representative Berman has intro-
duced the Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (PPPPA), 1 5 which would
107. For a further discussion of existing, recently amended copyright law, see
supra notes 80-103 and accompanying text.
108. See U.S. Rep. Howard L. Berman,,just Deserts for Scofflaws (July 9, 2002), at
http://news.com.com/2010-1078-942325.html ("There are solutions [to P2P
piracy], and Congress has a constitutional obligation to create or facilitate them.");
Hollings, supra note 53 ("Current digital rights management solutions are insuffi-
cient to rectify th[e] problem [of digital piracy].... [A] solution to this problem
... will require government action, including a mandate to ensure its swift and
universal adoption.").
109. For a further discussion of the impact of the DMCA and NET Act on
digital piracy, see supra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
110. See Berman, supra note 108 ("Under my bill, copyright owners would be
freed to use technology to impair P2P piracy .... "); Hollings, supra note 53
("[S]trong technological protections need to be layered on top of the copyright
laws, to complement the law as it exists today.").
111. Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048,
107th Cong. (2002).
112. See Hollings, supra note 53 (summarizing goal of CBDTPA).
113. See id. (describing timed negotiations required by Act); see alsoJohn Bor-
land, Anti-jiracy Bill Finally Sees Senate (March 21, 2002), at http://news.com.com/
2100-1023-866337.html ("The [CBDTPA] would require that the content, technol-
ogy and consumer-electronics industries work with consumer groups for a year to
set a standard technological means for protecting against digital piracy.").
114. See Hollings, supra note 53 (explaining that because FCC is to work in
consultation with private sector, ultimate solution should be initiated by govern-
ment and developed by private sector).
115. Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002).
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allow entertainment industry companies to disable, interfere with, block,
divert or otherwise impair peer-to-peer file-sharing networks to protect
copyrighted material being traded on those networks. ' 16 Although the
bill does not specify what techniques would be available to companies au-
thorized to attack peer-to-peer networks, it does require companies to
communicate to the Attorney General "specific technologies the copyright
holder intends to use to impair."' 117 The copyright holder may not delete
files, but if files are accidentally erased, a suit to recover damages must be
approved by the Attorney General and allowed only if the injury caused
monetary loss of more than $250.118
While the RLAA and MPAA have announced their approval and sup-
port of both bills, a variety of other organizations and interested parties
have decried them. 119 In ajoint press release, the BSA, Computer Systems
Policy Project (CSPP) and Information Technology Industry Council (ITI)
all condemned the CBDTPA.12° Ken Kay, Executive Director of the CSPP,
116. See Manjoo, supra note I (summarizing PPPPA).
117. See id. (quoting PPPPA).
118. See Declan McCullagh, Could Hollywood Hack Your PC? (July 23, 2002), at
http://news.com.com/2102-1023-945923.html (summarizing PPPPA).
119. See Manjoo, supra note 1 (quoting RIAA CEO Hilary Rosen as calling
Berman PPPPA an "'innovative approach to combating the serious problem of
Internet piracy'"). MPAA Senior Vice President for Government Relations Fritz
Attaway has endorsed the PPPPA. See McCullagh, supra note 118 (noting that
MPAA stresses that law-abiding Internet users should not be concerned). Hilary
Rosen has heralded the CBDTPA as "an unmistakable signal about the importance
of protecting digital music and other content from piracy." Press Release, Hilary
Rosen, On Introduction of Consumer Broadband Act (March 21, 2002), at http://
www.politechbot.com/docs/cbdtpa/riaa.cbdtpa.release.032102.html. MPAA Pres-
ident and CEO Jack Valenti has called the CBDTPA "a measure that will serve the
long-term interests of consumers ...... Press Release, Jack Valenti, On S. 2048
(Mar. 21, 2002), at http://www.politechbot.com/docs/cbdtpa/mpaa.cbdtpa.re-
lease.032102.html. But see Borland, supra note 113 ("The [CBDTPA] marks the
meeting point of several twisted political strands, each of which has drawn its own
political firestorm."); Brad King, Howling Mad Over Hollings'Bill (Mar. 28, 2002), at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,51337,00.html (stating that "[s]everal
consumer groups and electronics companies aligned themselves against Hol-
lings['s CBDTPA]"); Declan McCullagh, Anti-Copy Bill Slams Coders (Mar. 22, 2002),
at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,51274,00.html (explaining that "the
electronics industry, computer makers, chip makers and nonprofit advocacy
groups have slammed [the CBDTPA] as unworkable and preposterous").
120. Press Release, Business Software Alliance (BSA), Computer Systems Pol-
icy Project & Information Technology Industry Council, IT Industry Opposes Leg-
islation Calling for Government Content Protection Mandate on Technology
Products (Mar. 21, 2002), at http://www.politechbot.com/docs/cbdtpa/
bsa.cspp.iti.release.032102.html [hereinafter CBDTPA opposition] (posting state-
ments by Information Technology industry organizations strongly opposed to
CBDTPA). The Computer Systems Policy Project, founded in 1989, develops and
advocates "the IT industry's public policy positions on technology and trade is-
sues." Computer Systems Policy Project, About Us, at http://www.cspp.org/
aboutus.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (explaining that CSPP is Information Tech-
nology industry's leading advocacy group, comprised of eight industry chief execu-
tive officers). The mission of the CSPP is "to educate policynakers, opinion
leaders and the public on the technology industry, identify trends in technology
17
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predicted that the bill would "decrease consumer choice, degrade product
performance, stifle innovation, and reduce global competitiveness for US
IT products." 2 1 All of these organizations have argued that government
intervention is inappropriate and that digital piracy solutions should ulti-
mately come from the market.122 The Home Recording Rights Coalition
(HRRC) 12 3 shares these views, criticizing the bill for lacking a clear objec-
tive, ultimate goal or regulatory guidelines. 124 Jonathan Zuck, President
of the Association for Competitive Technology (ACT),1 25 has denounced
the bill as "simply wrongheaded," suggesting a more accurate title would
be the "Content Owners Market Promotion Act." 126
and their impact on our nation, and effectively participate in the lawmaking pro-
cess that affects [Information Technology] customers and [Information Technol-
ogy] companies." Computer Systems Policy Project, Message from Michael Dell, at
http://www.cspp.org/msgchair.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2003). The Information
Technology Industry Council (ITI) "represents the top U.S. providers of informa-
tion technology products and services." Information Technology Industry Coun-
cil, Who We Are, at http://www.itic.org/whoweare/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
121. CBDTPA opposition, supra note 120.
122. See id. ("The best solution to protecting digital content is a marketplace-
driven solution.") (quoting CSPP Executive Director Ken Kay). BSA President and
CEO Robert Holleyman maintained that "voluntary multi-industry efforts currently
underway should be permitted to continue in order to identify effective, workable
market solutions." Id. ITI President Rhett Dawson argued that the CBDTPA
"could stand in the way of consumers enjoying the benefits of innovation by having
the government make decisions that are best left to the marketplace." Id.
123. See Home Recording Rights Coalition (HRRC), Core Principles, at http://
hrrc.org/html/core-principles.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (explaining that
Home Recording Rights Coalition is comprised of consumers, retailers, profession-
als and manufacturers of consumer electronics dedicated to promoting fair use
rights in use of consumer electronics).
124. See Press Release, HRRC, Home Recording Rights Coalition Criticizes
Hollings/Stevens Bill for Inviting Undefined and Unlimited Regulation of Digital
Consumer Devices (Mar. 22, 2002), at http://www.politechbot.com/docs/cbdtpa/
hrrc.cbdtpa.032202.html ("'[The CBDTPA] lacks a clear objective for all of the
regulation that it mandates and any defined goal for the process it would start."')
(quoting HRRC Chairman Gary Shapiro). Shapiro went on to argue that the bill
represented a "particularly dangerous delegation of broad, unfettered regulatory
authority, which could have severe, adverse, long-term consequences for American
consumers. Indeed, this is a breathtaking delegation of authority to a regulatory
agency that is ill-equipped to perform such a monumental task." Id.
125. See Association for Competitive Technology, About Us, at http://
www.actonline.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (explaining that Association
for Competitive Technology (ACT) is national education and advocacy group for
technology industry). ACT is comprised of businesses in software, hardware, con-
sulting and Internet industries. Id.
126. Press Release, Association for Competitive Technology, Hollings' Digital
Rights Management is "Wrongheaded" (Mar. 22, 2002), at http://www.politech
bot.com/docs/cbdtpa/act.cbdtpa.032202.html. ACT President Jonathan Zuck
also opposed the bill, characterizing it as "government interference in a process
best handled by the market." Id.
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DigitalConsumer.org, an online consumer group dedicated to pre-
serving fair use rights in the use of digital consumer electronics, 127 de-
scribes the CBDTPA as anti-consumer and contrary to fair use rights,
contending that it will undermine innovation and ultimately be unsuccess-
ful. 128 The organization's principal argument is that any technological
copy-protection scheme the public or private sectors devise can and will be
reverse-engineered by expert hackers, resulting in a system that does noth-
ing to hinder piracy and instead only deprives legitimate consumers of
control and flexibility over legally obtained content.' 29 This argument is
supported by a number of respected computer security experts.] 
3 0
127. See DigitalConsumer.org, Overview: Wat We're All About, at http://
www.digitalconsumer.org/overview.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (explaining that
goal of DigitalConsumer.org is "to restore the balance of copyright law so that
artists and creators can prosper while citizens have reasonable flexibility to use
content in fair and legal ways").
128. See DigitalConsumer.org, Help Stop the CBDTPA, at http://
www.digitalconsumer.org/cbdtpa/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (identifying four ma-
jor problems with CBDTPA). DigitalConsumer.org argues that the CBDTPA's per-
sonal use exemption is substantially narrower than the fair use rights consumers
have enjoyed in the past. See id. (discussing section 3(e)(2) of CBDTPA). The
organization also points out that the justification for the bill, that better protection
of digital works will encourage content creators to make more works available, is
the same justification for the DMCA, which has been in effect for four years with-
out increasing noticeably the volume of digital material on the Internet. See id.
(maintaining that Hollywood has not offered volume of legal, downloadable digital
movies or music promised after enactment of DMCA). Furthermore, the CBDTPA
will stifle innovation by defeating digital playing and recording devices before they
are invented. See id. (arguing that CBDTPA will hinder discovering and imagining
unanticipated uses of technology).
129. See id. ("[C]opy protection isn't breakable by the average citizen, but it is
very breakable by software experts. A government mandated technology standard
will not be any more effective at preventing piracy. Instead, the consumer will lose
.. . .").
130. See id. ("The most respected computer security experts agree that this
approach to preventing piracy won't work."). Edward Felten, Associate Professor
of Computer Science at Princeton University and Director of the Secure Internet
Programming Laboratory, has testified to this claim at a Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee Hearing on digital copyright:
[Elvery copy protection scheme for general-purpose computers that has
undergone serious public scrutiny has been found to be ineffective.
Consider what will happen if a government-mandated protection
measure turns out not to work. Such a measure would do many things: it
would inconvenience honest consumers; it would raise the price of media
players; it would lengthen product development cycles; it would impede
the development of new and better standards. Everyone would suffer,
except the pirates. The industry that devised the measure would look
technically inept, and the government that mandated its use would look
worse.
Competition, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Digital Age: Is the Marketplace Working
to Protect Digital Creative Works?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 107th
Cong. (Mar. 11, 2002) (statement by Professor Edward W. Felten), available at
http://www.felten.com/felten-testimony.pdf.
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B. Social Approaches
Social approaches to combating digital piracy fundamentally involve
changing the way society views intellectual property rights.131 The goal of
these approaches is to reconcile the values of a society that largely toler-
ates copyright infringement and copyright owners who do not.l3 2 To this
end, one approach is to condition society to be less tolerant of copyright
infringement while another approach proposes to do away with copyright
(and, therefore, infringement) of certain works altogether. 3
To make society less tolerant of copyright infringement, the en-
tertainment industry has invested in education programs designed to rein-
force consumers' value of intellectual property.'13 4 A government task
force in the United Kingdom has proposed that consumer intellectual
property education should begin in grade school to teach children the
importance of respecting copyright. 135 By implementing intellectual
property education into the standard curricula of twelve- to eighteen-year-
olds, the government hopes to achieve a "'[g]reater recognition by the
public of the role and importance of intellectual property rights .... 136
The Director of Copyright at the government's Patent Office categorizes
this educational method as a social approach stating: "'By bringing aware-
131. For a further discussion of social approaches to digital piracy, see infra
notes 132-48 and accompanying text.
132. See Alan Docherty, Why Can't Johnny Respect Copyrights? (July 16, 2001), at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/20O1/07/16/abcip/print.html ("'The idea
that counterfeiting and piracy are victimless crimes is an all too common percep-
tion.'") (quoting Anthony Murphy, Director of Copyright at Great Britain's Patent
Office); Manjoo, supra note I ("[I]t's obvious that music buyers don't have any
qualms about stealing music-and what business person wouldn't want to stop the
outright theft of a product?") (quoting independent music industry analyst Aram
Sinnreich). One commentator observes that "'[y]oting people, and other people,
believe in a version of copyright law that is different from the one now on the
books. Many of them believe, for example, that if you buy a CD, you buy the right
to share it.'" See Docherty, supra (quoting Professor Jessica Litman). Professor
Stan Liebowitz points out that the conflict between the values of copyright owners
and consumers is the fundamental driving force of copyright law. See Liebowitz,
supra note 3, at 3 ("The issue at the heart of copyright, indeed of all intellectual
property law, is the degree to which copyright owners can appropriate the value
produced by the consumption, or appreciation, of their works by others.").
133. See generally Ku, supra note 28, at 263 (argtuing that copyright protection
for certain digital works is no longer justified); Docherty, supra note 132 (describ-
ing educational program designed to increase society's value of intellectual prop-
erty rights).
134. See Washington, supra note 23, at lIC (noting that nation's largest
software makers have instituted education programs for consumers); Manjoo,
supra note 1 ("' [E]ducating people about the reasons why unauthorized file shar-
ing hurts the music they care about in the long run . . . [ius a key component of
any long-term effort to change people's behavior."') (quoting RIAA spokesman
Jonathan Lamy).
135. See Docherty, supra note 132 (describing program developed by United
Kingdom's Creative Industries Task Force).
136. See id. (quoting Chris Smith, former Secretary of State for Culture, Media
and Sport).
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ness of the importance of copyright into our schools, tomorrow's consum-
ers can take their place in a community which understands, values and
respects intellectual property.'""137
At least one scholar has argued for a completely opposite approach:
removing copyright protection for digital works altogether.I' 8 This argu-
ment posits that "the economics of digital technology undercuts prior as-
sumptions about the efficacy of a private property regime for information,
a public good."'' 9 Traditionally, copyright protection was founded on the
principle that copyright was needed to compensate publishers for the high
costs of distribution and to provide authors with an incentive to create
content.' 40 In the digital age, however, the Internet has lowered the cost
of content distribution such that anyone with a computer, Internet access
and electricity can become a distributor. 14 1 Because consumers can inter-
nalize this low cost of distribution, the traditional copyright scheme is now
little more than "an argument for protecting content distributors in a
world in which middlemen are obsolete.' 142
Both of these social approaches to digital piracy, while polar in the-
ory, are burdened with the mutual problem of reduction to practice.' 43
Citing the failure of other education-based programs, critics of the educa-
137. See id. (quoting Anthony Murphy, Patent Office's Director of Copyright).
138. See Ku, supra note 28, at 263 (arguing against copyright protection for
digital works).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 266-67 ("Copyright was necessary to provide financial incentives
for both creation and distribution.").
141. See id. at 271-72 ("The only costs of becoming a global distributor (or
pirate) of digital content are the price of a computer, Internet access, and
electricity.").
142. Id. at 263. Professor Ku further argues that granting copyrights to au-
thors is no longer as important of an incentive to encourage content creation be-
cause sufficient incentives can be found in other, secondary markets. See id.
(arguing that, at least with respect to digital music, "exclusive rights to reproduce
and distribute copies provide little if any incentive for creation, and that digital
technology makes it possible to compensate artists without control [of content dis-
tribution]"). For example, because the majority of professional musicians earn
most of their income through ticket sales of live performances, "free, noncommer-
cial distribution of music should have little or no impact on the incentives for
creating music." Id. at 308. The motion picture industry can also derive alterna-
tive incentives from secondary markets. See id. at 323 ("Arguably, the creation of
television programming and motion pictures, like music, may not require addi-
tional funding, because it is already adequately funded through advertising reve-
nue, programming subscriptions, and box office ticket sales."). Furthermore, as
long as artists retain the right to license derivative works and trademarks and to
endorse products and services, substantial incentives can be derived from markets
for derivatives of original content. See id. at 309 ("[P]opular artists will still be able
to earn significant income from the licensing and sales of tie-in products ... [as
well as] from endorsements, advertising, and public appearances.").
143. See generally id. at 324 (raising rhetorical questions concerning problems
with implementing creative destruction of copyright); Docherty, supra note 132
(discussing pragmatic obstacles to implementing intellectual property education
programs).
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tional approach argue that "[m]oral education programs have little or no
positive effect upon moral behavior, achievement or anything else."
14 4
Another criticism of the educational approach is that its teachings would
be based on laws that are not only controversial, but also constantly
changing. 1
45
The "creative destruction" approach to copyright is clearly controver-
sial. 146 Implementation of this approach would essentially destroy the dis-
tribution functions of the software, recording and motion picture
industries. 14 7 Considering implementation of this approach would in-
volve fundamental legislative changes, the immense lobbying power of
these industries is an insurmountable obstacle.
14 8
144. See Docherty, supra note 132 (quoting professorJames Davison Hunter).
The Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program is one example of a failed
moral education program. See id. (commenting on ineffectiveness of DARE pro-
gram). In 2001, DARE administrators admitted that the nation's largest and most
expensive drug prevention program was ineffective. See Dawn MacKeen, Just Say
No to DARE (Feb. 16, 2001), at http://archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/02/
16/dare/print.html (discussing failure of DARE program). Furthermore, research
indicates that the program actually contributed to increasing drug use by high
school students. See id. (indicating past research has found DARE program may
have played role in increasing rates of drug use by high school students).
145. See Docherty, supra note 132 (noting that intellectual property education
in schools may be inappropriate because laws are in flux and hotly contested). As
one student commentator aptly put it, "[o]ver-arching laws such as the DMCA are
prone to challenge and change, and a lesson plan written today could be incorrect
a year from now, making it difficult to compose a static curriculum." Pantages,
supra note 39, at 183 (citing Docherty, supra note 132).
146. See Ku, supra note 28, at 324 ("There will of course be opposition to this
vision.").
147. See id. ('just as Gutenberg's printing press threatened the dominance of
scribes, peer-to-peer networking and MP3s clearly threaten the recording industry,
whose business depends upon manufacturing and distributing old bottles."). Pro-
fessor Ku uses the following analogy to demonstrate the obsolescence of middle-
men in digital content distribution:
[D]igital representation frees content from the need for a tangible me-
dium to distribute it. In the past, content could be conveyed to the pub-
lic only through physical media such as film, paper, plastic, etc., and the
physical media limited its distribution and copying. Distributing copy-
righted works in the form of books, CDs, and videos was similar to the
distribution of wine. In order to distribute wine to the public, one
needed bottles. Even if wine was plentiful, bottles were not. In contrast,
the data representing a recent hit song, a newborn's picture, or a
scholar's work in progress no longer need to be carried in plastic or on
paper. Digital information can be conveyed without the need for a bot-
tle. Reduced to ones and zeros, digital information can be transmitted
through the radio waves of the electromagnetic spectrum, as electrical
impulses through telephone and cable wires, and as light across fiber op-
tic networks with the information alone traveling to the recipient.
Id. at 270-71.
148. See generallyJEsslcA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22-32 (Prometheus 2001)
(discussing lobbying power of entertainment industry with respect to copyright
law).
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C. Market Approaches
Market approaches to combating digital piracy involve technological
and content-oriented methods. 149 These approaches derive their method-
ology from principles of economics and the nature of consumer behavior
in the private sector.'
50
One common market approach to digital piracy is copy-protection
technology.'51 As discussed above, the motion picture industry has had
limited success with this approach in the implementation of CSS technol-
ogy on DVDs. 1 52 This encryption technology was designed to regulate ac-
cess to and prevent copying of content on DVDs. 15 3 The technology
"requires the use of appropriately configured hardware such as a DVD
player or a computer DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back, but
not copy, motion pictures on DVDs." 154 Because only DVD players con-
taining appropriate keys can decrypt and play CSS-protected DVDs, manu-
facturers must license the technology to make their players compatible
with commercial DVDs.1
5 5
149. For a further discussion of market approaches to digital piracy, see infra
notes 150-96 and accompanying text.
150. See Manjoo, supra note 1 (recognizing that justification for market-based
solutions to digital piracy derive from principle that "'consumers set the tone for
the marketplace"') (quoting music industry analyst Aram Sinnreich).
151. See Declan McCullagh, House Rep's Rap: Unshackle the CD (Mar. 7, 2002),
at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,50886,00.html ("'The notion of
copy protection is certainly not new to the entertainment industry. Even computer
software already employ various technology protections as appropriate for their
marketplace and their consumers."') (quoting Recording Industry Association of
America CEO Hilary Rosen).
152. For a further discussion of CSS technology, see supra note 43 and infra
notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
153. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that motion picture studios required such technology to
stem high risk of DVD piracy). The motion picture studios realized that the risk of
DVD piracy was very high because the digital nature of the content allowed for easy
copying without degradation. See id. (discussing need for copy-protection system
on DVDs). Consequently, CSS was developed by Matsushita Electric Industrial
Company and Toshiba Corporation in 1996, one year prior to the initial release of
DVDs containing motion pictures in digital format. See id. at 309-10 (explaining
development and use of CSS technology).
154. Id. at 308. Specifically, a DVD player decrypts a CSS-protected DVD with
a decryption algorithm derived from a series of keys stored on the DVD and DVD
player. See id. at 310 (describing functioning of CSS).
155. See id. at 310 (explaining that "manufacturers may not, consistent with
their licenses, make equipment that would supply digital output that could be used
in copying protected DVDs"). To prevent the technology from becoming publicly
available and used to copy content, CSS is licensed under strict security require-
ments. See id. (clarifying need for manufacturers to license technology). To maxi-
mize the ubiquity of CSS as the standard copy-protection system on commercial
DVDs, the technology is licensed on a royalty-free basis. See id. (detailing licensing
of CSS). Originally licensed by Matsushita and Toshiba, its creators, CSS is now
licensed by the DVD Copy Control Association. See id. at 310 n.60 (explicating
licensing of CSS).
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Recognizing the effectiveness of copy-protection technology in secur-
ing content on DVDs, the recording industry is currently experimenting
with copy-protection technology on CDs to prevent the copying of digital
music. 156 Indeed, copy-protected CDs have already been released in Euro-
pean and Asian markets, but have had a slower introduction to the Ameri-
can market. 157 Part of the reason why the technology has not seen
widespread deployment in the United States is because it has not been
completely successful in foreign markets. 158 When copy-protected CDs
were initially released by BMG, a major record label, in Germany, three to
four percent of the 100,000 sold were returned because they would not
play in several types of CD players, including car CD players. 5 ' The in-
compatibility of the CDs with standard players was a surprise to the com-
pany, having successfully tested the CDs on a thousand different players
prior to release. 1" The company also experienced similar problems in
Great Britain.'"" Despite these compatibility problems, BMG planned to
work with Midbar, the Israeli software firm that had developed the copy-
protection system, to improve the technology.'" 2 Ideally, the record com-
pany would like to implement a copy-protection system that allows for a
single copy of a CD, made for a consumer's personal use, but would other-
wise not allow repeat copying. 163
156. See Cohen, supra note 34 ("Each of the five major [record] labels is now
experimenting with anti-piracy technology that prevents computer CD-ROM drives
from playing or ripping music in the popular MP3 format.").
157. See id. (explaining that copy-protected CDs have spread rapidly in Eu-
rope and Asia, but have moved more slowly in America). As of June 2002, only
four copy-protected CDs had been officially released in the United States: The More
Fast and Furious soundtrack on Universal, hip-hop artist Pretty Willie's debut Enter
the Life of Suella on Universal and releases by country artists Charley Pride and Len
Doolin on Nashville indie labels. See id. (providing list of copy-protected releases
in United States).
158. See Chris Oakes, Copy-Protected CDs Taken Back (Feb. 3, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,33921,00.html (reporting problems with trial
release of copy-protected CDs in Germany).
159. See id. (describing incompatibility of new CDs with CD players). The
copy-protection technology was initially implemented on January 24, 2000 with the
release of two rock CDs, one, made by the popular Finnish band Him, immediately
became the number one seller in Germany. See id. (detailing original release of
copy-protected CDs in Germany). By the end of the first week after the release,
the record company had to ship additional orders of CDs without the copy-protec-
tion to salvage sales. See id. (explaining that company was mindful of consumer
frustration with incompatible CDs).
160. See id. (stating that CDs had been tested for compatibility prior to
release).
161. See Cohen, supra note 34 (describing BMG's recall of copy-protected CDs
in Britain when Natalie Imbruglia's White Lilies Island would not play in regular CD
players).
162. See Oakes, supra note 158 (reporting plans to improve compatibility of
Midbar's Cactus Data Shield technology).
163. See Cohen, supra note 34 ("Record companies say new CDs may allow for
a single copy to be made, but will be in a locked format to prevent repeat copying
and burning."). Record labels believe such a system is needed to provide "'a mini-
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A newer, more creative market approach to digital music piracy is
MP3 "spoofing."164 As discussed above, the non-centralized nature of to-
day's most popular P2P networks makes regulation of copyright infringe-
ment extremely difficult. 165 Without central servers to threaten with legal
action, the recording industry is currently trying to fight digital music
piracy by flooding P2P networks with spoofed MP3s. 'I 6 Record labels con-
tract with firms like New York's Overpeer to create and inundate P2P net-
works with looped, silent and distorted versions of the labels' most
popularly traded files. 167 The strategy is to make obtaining a decent copy
of a file so frustrating that network users will give up and buy a legitimate
copy of the music. 168
While this spoofing strategy has undoubtedly achieved some success,
it will most likely be transient as P2P networks are already promising that
new upgrades will have anti-spoof features. 169 This tactic is also criticized
for its potential to anger both artists, who suffer the corruption of their
work,1 70 and music fans, who comprise the consumers that keep record
labels in business.'1
7
Another commonly suggested market approach to digital music
piracy is the creation of commercial P2P networks that offer legal MP3s of
copyrighted material at a reasonable cost. ' 72 Proponents of this approach
mal degree of copy protection to slow down frictionless trading of music."' Id.
(quoting EMI Vice President of New Media Ted Cohen).
164. See David Kushner, The Digital Beat: MP3 Spoofs Are Stoopid, ROLLING
STONE, July 23, 2002, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/newsar-
ticle.asp?nid=16321 (explaining recording industry's latest attempt to hamper
peer-to-peer digital music trading).
165. For a further discussion of non-centralized P2P networks, see supra notes
35-37 and accompanying text.
166. See Kushner, supra note 164 (describing MP3 spoofing).
167. See id. (reporting that music by Eminem, Alanis Morissette and P. Diddy
are among most spoofed MP3s). Overpeer has recently applied for a patent on
"spoofware" that works by "'deteriorating or damaging a sound quality of an origi-
nal music file of a record of a cooperating record corporation."' Id. (quoting pat-
ent application abstract). The patent application was filed Oct. 15, 2001. See U.S.
Patent Application Number 20020082999, June 27, 2002, available at http://
appftl .uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sectl =ptOl&Sect2=H ITOFF&d=PGO I&p=
1 &u=/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.html&r=l&f=G&l=50&sl ='20020082999'.PGNR.&
OS=dn/20020082999&RS=dn/20020082999 (providing patent application for
spoofware).
168. See Kushner, supra note 164 (elucidating MP3 spoofing strategy).
169. See id. (providing that Morpheus has annotmnced plans to include anti-
spoof software in its next upgrade and KaZaA and BearShare already employ user
ratings of files that undermine spoofs).
170. See id. (wondering how groups such as the "[Red Hot] Chili Peppers feel
about having their music butchered in the name of commerce").
171. See id. ("Once again, rather than creatively exploiting the passion of mu-
sic fans online, the labels are pissing off the very consumers who keep them in
business.").
172. See Manjoo, supra note 1 (suggesting that because copyrighted material is
increasingly difficult to download on popular P2P networks, record labels would
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argue that consumers are getting increasingly frustrated with using cur-
rent free P2P networks due to such hassles as unreliable connections to
other network users, unpredictable quality of MP3s, prevalence of spoofed
MP3s and annoying ad- and spy-ware bundled with P2P applications.' 73
Furthermore, research suggests that consumers are willing to pay for digi-
tal music services, provided such services offer all of the benefits with none
of the frustrations of a free network. ' 74
As a result, some recording industry companies have initiated sub-
scription services.1 75 These services, however, have not been seriously
competitive with free networks because they lack "the range and flexibility
of the free file traders." 176 At least one music industry analyst has argued
that a successful subscription service needs to offer four features: music
from all five major record labels, the capacity to play songs from multiple
computers, CD burning and unlimited access to songs. 177 Although some
of the subscription services are beginning to offer these features, rules and
be extraordinarily successful in offering more efficient downloading of legitimate
MP3s at reasonable cost).
173. See id. ("The process [of downloading music from free P2P networks i]s
fraught with the usual hassles of trading-the songs are there but the downloads
hang, terminate inexplicably or, if they come through, sound as if they were re-
corded on wax cylinders."). Manjoo describes "adware, spyware, Trojan software,
and even possible security holes" as "increasing, and increasingly annoying, con-
cerns posed by the file-trading applications themselves." Id. See generally Damien
Cave, The Parasite Economy (Aug. 2, 2001), at http://archive.salon.com/tech/fea-
ture/2001/08/02/parasite-capital/print.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (discuss-
ing problems associated with software bundled with P2P network applications).
174. See Manjoo, supra note 1 (arguing that subscription P2P networks could
be commercially viable if they offered enough to consumers). Independent music
industry analyst Aram Sinnreich maintains that there is "'overwhelming year-over-
year survey data' to show that people will pay for a subscription service that has all
the perks, and none of the hassles, of a free system." Id.
175. See id. (identifying Listen.com, MusicNet and Pressplay as leading digital
music subscription services). For example, Listen.com's Rhapsody service, offers
unlimited streaming of an extensive catalog of CDs for less than ten dollars a
month. See Listen.com, FAQs and Help, at http://www.listen.com/faq.jsp?sect=
main (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (discussing subscription plans and operation of
service). A subscription to Rhapsody's AllAccess catalog gives a user access to un-
limited streaming of thousands of CDs and fifty commercial-free Internet radio
stations at a cost of $9.95 per month. See id. (detailing AllAccess subscription
plan). Other similar services include Pressplay and MusicNet. See Pressplay, About
Us, at http://www.pressplay.com/abotitus.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (explain-
ing that Pressplay is joint venture by Universal Music Group and Sony Music En-
tertainment); MusicNet, About Us, at http://www.musicnet.com/ (last visited Jan.
7, 2003) (explaining that MusicNet is joint venture by Warner Music Group, BMG
Entertainment, EMI Recorded Music, Sony Music Entertainment, Universal Music
Group, Zomba, Ritmoteca and Sanctuary).
176. Manjoo, supra note 1 (reporting that less than five million people have
tried subscription services).
177. See id. (qtuoting Aram Sinnreich, independent music industry analyst in
Los Angeles).
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licensing complications have crippled their initial effectiveness in enticing
users away from free P2P networks.
1 78
A fairly recent market approach to software piracy is the implementa-
tion of activation schemes.' 79 Under an activation scheme, shortly after
installing software on a computer, the user must contact the publisher for
an activation number to continue using the software.1 80 This method is
most notably incorporated in Microsoft's Office XP and Windows XP ti-
tles. 18 1 Microsoft's scheme allows one to use Windows XP for thirty days
or Office XP for fifty days after installation before the software requires an
activation number to continue functioning. 18 2 Multiple activations of one
copy of a program indicate potential piracy.183 At this stage, the newness
of activation schemes makes evaluating their effectiveness in preventing
software piracy difficult.' 8 4 Microsoft has reported, however, that despite
initial complaints from users and the press, customers have generally ac-
cepted the activation process. 8 5
Finally, a logical and effective market approach to all forms of digital
piracy is to increase the product value of legitimate forms of copyrighted
content by offering consumers an element or feature that cannot be pi-
rated and distributed with primary content. 186 One way to increase the
value of legitimate versions of content is to issue limited editions or other-
wise make the content collectable. 18 7 Another way is to bundle merchan-
178. See id. (stating that services' limitations are result of "different labels
releas[ing] different catalogs to different services, with varying restrictions and at
confusing price scales").
179. See Washington, supra note 23, at lIC (reporting that nation's largest
software makers have recently developed activation schemes to curtail software
piracy).
180. See id. (explaining operation of activation scheme).
181. See id. (describing Microsoft's use of activation schemes in XP series).
182. See id. (discussing operation of Microsoft's activation schemes).
183. See id. (elucidating operation of activation scheme).
184. See id. (explaining that activation scheme's success in stemming piracy is
"'hard to evaluate'" at this point) (quoting Microsoft attorney Tim Cranton).
185. See id. (reporting that activation scheme has generally been accepted by
customers despite early criticism).
186. See David Kushner, The Digital Beat: Eminem's Sony MP3 Show, ROLLING
STONE, June 10, 2002, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/newsar-
ticle.asp?nid=16081 (arguing that faced with rampant piracy, digital music produc-
ers need to "cop to the Internet and pursue more forward-thinking strategies-
such as finding new ways to make people want to buy CDs"). Kushner posits that
increased legitimate product value is "the oldest trick in the book, but it works like
gold: Toss something in that makes the consumers feel like he's [sic] getting some-
thing cool for free." Id. This reasoning also underlies Aram Sinnreich's require-
ments for a successful digital music subscription service: "[Y]ou [content
providers] have to make them [consumers] feel like they're getting a lot."
Manjoo, supra note 1.
187. See Kushner, supra note 186 (applauding Interscope's inclusion of free
DVD with first 2 million copies of Eminem's The Eminem Show).
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dise with the primary content.' 88 Interscope Records recently combined
both of these methods in the marketing of Eminem's The Eminem Show by
including a complimentary DVD containing live performances and inter-
views with the first two million copies sold.' 8 9
Indeed, the release of The Eminem Show is the perfect example of how
record labels can successfully utilize market approaches to combat the ef-
fects of digital piracy. 190 Prior to the release of the album, Interscope had
taken unprecedented steps to keep music from the album off P2P net-
works, to maximize initial record sales.i 9 Despite efforts to control access
to the album prior to release, music was eventually leaked and played on a
nationally broadcast radio program.1 92 Consequently, the label scrapped
its multimillion-dollar marketing plan and released the album six days
early.'9 3 Despite the leak, the album debuted at number one, sold more
than 280,000 copies on the first day and grossed more than 1.3 million
copies by the end of the first week. 19 4 As journalist David Kushner aptly
put it: "The Internet didn't kill the radio star-it helped him sell a lot of
records." 19 5 The reason the album did so well despite leaks to P2P net-
works is simple: Music fans still want authentic CDs.' 9 6
188. See id. (encouraging record companies' inclusion of extra merchandise
with CDs and providing example of Interscope's inclusion of complimentary DVD
with Eminem's The Eminem Show, which featured bonus performances and
interviews).
189. See id. (discussing strategic marketing of Eminem's The Eminem Show to
minimize effect of pre-release piracy).
190. See generally id. (describing success of The Eminem Show).
191. See id. (explaining that rather than sending out advance copies, Inter-
scope assembled reviewers for listening parties). The label wanted to avoid what
had happened to Madonna's Music, Oasis's Heathen Chenistry and Korn's Untouch-
ables, all of which suffered leaks to P2P networks prior to their official releases. See
id. (discussing effect of leaks of other albums to P2P networks prior to official
release).
192. See id. (explaining that DJs Opie and Anthony broadcast parts of album
and tatnted lnterscope by reading on air cease-and-desist letter sent by label).
193. See id. ("Fed tip, Eminem decided to toss the multimillion-dollar market-
ing plan out the window and release the album six days early, on May 28th.").
194. See id. (reporting success of album's release).
195. Id.
196. See id. (rationalizing album's success). Kushner explains:
Ironically, Eminem's MP3 show has only underscored the importance of
peer-to-peer sites in the new economy. Listen up Interscope et al: Music
fans want the CDs! They want the packaging! They want the versatility of
discs-the ease of play, of popping the music into car stereos, portable
players, home entertainment centers. Walk into the room of any four-
teen-year-old Eminem fan and you'll see just how much disposable in-
come she blows on merchandise. If she's willing to spend ten bucks on a
poster, believe me, she's going to own a copy of the disc.
Id. One reason Professor Stan Liebowitz suggests why the recording industry is not
suffering as much as it should be from digital piracy on P2P networks is that con-
sumers like the tangibility of CDs. See Damien Cave, File Sharing: Innocent Until
Proven Guilty (June 13, 2002), at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/06/
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VI. CONCLUSION
Digital piracy is clearly a constant menace to the entertainment indus-
try.1 97 Rivaled with piracy efforts that grow more sophisticated as new
technologies emerge, the entertainment industry has struggled to devise
enduring anti-piracy methods. 19a Legal approaches, while popular with
the recording and motion picture industries, provide only limited success
and threaten to backfire as they become more insular in their protection
of copyright owners.' 99 Social approaches, by changing society's attitude
toward copyright either through education or elimination, propose a very
effective means of minimizing digital piracy, but remain largely ideological
and, consequently, face overwhelming obstacles in reduction to prac-
tice.20 Ultimately, it appears that market approaches offer the most suc-
cessful immediate remedies, but depend upon constant evolution and
innovation to sustain anything beyond an ephemeral solution. 20 1 For
long-term success, the entertainment industry must utilize its complete ar-
senal in its war on digital piracy. Only by balancing prudent legal ap-
proaches, feasible social approaches and adaptable market approaches
can the software, recording and motion picture industries hope to gain
ground in their epic battle against digital copyright infringement.
Matthew C. Mousley
13/liebowitz/print.html ("'They [consumers] like holding these things [CDs]."')
(quoting Professor Stan Liebowitz) (emphasis in original).
197. For a further discussion of the effects of digital piracy on the entertain-
ment industry, see supra notes 14-56 and accompanying text.
198. For a further discussion of approaches to digital piracy, see supra notes
104-96 and accompanying text.
199. For a further discussion of legal approaches to digital piracy, see supra
notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
200. For a further discussion of social approaches to digital piracy, see supra
notes 131-48 and accompanying text.
201. For a further discussion of market approaches to digital piracy, see supra
notes 149-96 and accompanying text.
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